Juni Alonzo Church, Frege Gottlob. Der Gedanke. Beiträge zur Philosophie des deutschen Idealismus, vol. 1 no. 2, pp. 58–Frege Gottlob. Friedrich Ludwig Gottlob Frege was a German philosopher, logician, and mathematician. He is .. “Der Gedanke: Eine logische Untersuchung” (“The Thought: A Logical Inquiry”), in Beiträge zur Philosophie des Deutschen Idealismus I: 58– After his retirement in , Frege moved to Bad Kleinen, near Wismar, and managed to publish a number of important articles, “Der Gedanke” (“The Thought “.

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Selected ReadingsCambridge: Science Logic and Mathematics. The Foundations of Frege’s Logic. Begriffsschrift The Foundations of Arithmetic But Dummett himself was sharply critical of the more platonistic aspects he found in Frege’s doctrine of sense and thought, and the insufficient measure Frege took of the role that mental, cognitive, and communicative activity plays in shaping, and limiting, what sense, meaning, thought, and understanding could ever amount to, within human life.

The Cambridge Companion to Frege. MendelsohnInquiry Neuenhahn, ; reprinted in Angelelli [] pp. In Frege’s view, unlike objects, all functions are “unsaturated” insofar as they require arguments to yield values. You are commenting using your Facebook account.

Frege, Gottlob | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy

However, by this time, he had completely given up on his logicism, concluding that the paradoxes of class or set theory made it impossible. We saw above that we can gain some understanding of number claims as involving second-level concepts, or concepts of concepts. Although there had been attempts to fashion at least the core of such a language made by Boole and others working in the Leibnizian tradition, Frege found their work unsuitable for a number of reasons.

However, while the volume was already in the publication process, Frege received a letter from Bertrand Russell, informing him that it was possible to prove a contradiction in the logical system of the first volume of the G rundgesetzewhich included a naive calculus for classes.


One of the many decisive influences of Dummett’s work was to effect the broadening of interpretive focus beyond Frege’s Bedeutungstheorie to include his account of senseand in particular to accord pride of place to the sense expressed by assertoric sentences — Frege’s ‘ thoughts [Gedanken]’ — along with the compositional relations among sense-constituents of thoughts.

Though the German book never appeared, the papers were published together in Logische Untersuchungened. So far we have only considered the distinction as it applies to expressions that name some object including abstract objects, such as numbers. Frege is often credited with having founded predicate logic. There is only one such number zero. Gabriel suggests the date of Sources were checked, errors were eliminated, and page numbers were added whenever possible. Here we can see the connection with the understanding of number expressions as being statements about concepts.

Gottlob Frege (1848—1925)

Bauer-Mengelberg in van Heijenoort [] pp. Each natural number can be defined in terms of the previous one: It represented the first axiomatization of logic, and was complete in its treatment of both propositional logic and first-order quantified logic.

In Fregean terminology, an expression is said to express its sense, and denote or refer to its reference. Edited and translated by Montgomery Furth. Kaal in McGuinness [] p.

Frege levels two arguments against the claim: Oxford University Press, gedankke edition MartinichA. As Garavaso and Vassallo rightly emphasize, Frege takes grasping a thought to be only necessary but not sufficient for knowledgesince knowledge requires both holding the thought to be true ‘judging’ it so, as Frege uses the term and also having sufficient justification for doing so, e. It is an active matter of debate and discussion to what extent and how this principle coheres with Frege’s later theory of meaning, eer what is clear geedanke that it plays an important role in his own philosophy of mathematics as described in the Grundlagen.


However, it then becomes to difficult to explain why 2 seems informative while 1 does not. For Frege, the distinction applies also to other sorts of expressions and even whole sentences or propositions. The expression, ” is a planet” has as its reference a function that yields as value the True when saturated by an object such as Saturn or Venus, but the False when saturated by a person or the number three. Kraal in McGuinness [] pp. Aberdeen University Press, For example, if we consider the propositions: Frege’s “conceptual notation” however can represent such inferences.

Verlag Mentis GabrielG. Gottlob Frege – – Philosophical Review 59 2: Given that value-ranges themselves are taken to be objects, if the concept in question is that of being a extension of a concept not included in itselfone can conclude that the extension of this concept is in itself just in case it is not. Translated by Eike-Henner W. They draw on Frege’s late manuscript on the ‘sources of cognition [Erkennntisquellen]’ 71where Frege sketches the following picture of knowledge: Frege is one of the founders of analytic philosophywhose work on logic and language gave rise to the linguistic turn in philosophy.

Translated by Peter Long and Roger White. Frege was also an opponent of formalism, the view that arithmetic can be understood as the study of uninterpreted formal systems.

In the case of concepts, their value-ranges were identified with their extensions. Translated as The Foundations of Arithmetic: