John Duns Scotus (/66–) was one of the most important and The Ordinatio, which Scotus seems to have been revising up to his. John Duns, commonly called Duns Scotus is generally considered to be one of the three most . The standard version is the Ordinatio (also known as the Opus oxoniense), a revised version of lectures he gave as a bachelor at Oxford. Marenbon, J. (). Duns Scotus, Ordinatio, Prologue, part 1, qu. unica. [Other].

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Moreover, without intuitive cognition I could never know about my own intellectual states. His students and disciples extensively edited his papers, often confusing them with works by other writers, in many cases leading to misattribution and confused transmission. For Plato posited that the idea is a substance existing per sea separate nature, without accidents as the Philosopher attributes to himin which would be the whole nature of the species – which according to what Aristotle attributes to him would be said of any individual by a formal predication, saying ‘this is this’.

In other projects Wikimedia Commons Wikiquote Wikisource. It is not possible for there to be an accidentally ordered series of causes unless there is an essentially ordered series. Some moral truths are necessary truths, and even God can’t change those.

Rather, the specific degree of goodness of a thing is just an intrinsic, non-quantitative feature of that thing. The First Being is intellectual and volitional, and the intellect and will are identical with the essence of ordinatoo supreme nature.

If we are going to use Anselm’s test, we must first come up with our concept—say, of good. Lrdinatio what made it that very body was its substantial form, which ex hypothesi is no longer there.

Therefore, to say that a nature is of itself this according to the meaning earlier explained of a nature which is of itself thisand yet that is can be this and that by something else advenient, is to say contradictories.

Mirror Sites View this site from another server: Therefore, “Something — different from God — is possible” is necessary, because being is divided into the contingent and the necessary. The ultimate specific differences are primo diverse, and therefore nothing one per se can be abstracted from them; however, it does not follow because of this that the [things] constituted are primo diverse and not of some one ratio.


We can’t analyze this change as an accidental change, since there doesn’t seem to be any substance that persists through the change. And according to this, some specific difference has a concept not ‘simply simple’, for example, that which is taken from a form, and some does have a concept ‘simply simple’, that which is taken from the ultimate abstraction of a form about this distinction wcotus specific differences see dist. Thus the claim that Martin Heidegger wrote his Habilitationsschrift on Scotus [27] is only half true, as the second part is actually based on the work by Erfurt.

Duns Scotus

Second, we have certainty with respect to quite a lot of causal judgments derived from experience. Any contingent truth whatsoever depends on God’s will.

The Ordinatii Encyclopedia of Philosophy. There are four types of knowledge in which infallible certainty is possible. Intellectual intuitive cognition does not require phantasms; the cognized object somehow just causes the intellectual act by which its existence is made present to the intellect.

John Duns Scotus

Duns Scotus on Divine Love: Blessed John Duns Scotus, O. So at bottom there is simply the sheer fact that God willed one orfinatio rather than another. From there he shows that one primacy implies the others, and finally there can only be one nature that is the First Efficient Cause, Ultimate End, and the Most Perfect Nature. What you can have and in fact do have, Aristotle thinks is a quantitative infinity by successive parts.

Scotus ascribes to Aquinas the following argument for the divine infinity: Intellectual appetite is just one of the two fundamental inclinations in the will. See Wikipedia’s guide to writing better articles for suggestions.

John Duns Scotus

Therefore, it is up to God’s will whether that proposition will be true or false. Baroque Period to the French Revolution. Therefore this opinion posits as much commonness as Plato posited in the ideas.


So dcotus we can’t use the concepts we get from creatures, we can’t use any concepts at all, and so we can’t talk about God—which is false.

Metaphysicstheologylogicepistemologyethics. For it is Scotus’s fundamental conviction that morality is impossible without libertarian freedom, and since he sees no way for there to be libertarian freedom on Aquinas’s eudaimonistic understanding of ethics, Aquinas’s understanding must be rejected.

And yet there must be something that persists even through substantial change, since otherwise we wouldn’t have change at all; substances would come to exist from nothing and disappear into nothing. Not even God himself could make them false.

But in order to respond, Scotus makes a modal move and reworks the argument. Catholic University of America Press. John Duns Scotus, Contingency and Freedom: Ethics and Moral Psychology 5. For just as it was said elsewhere Scotus considers a number of arguments for the incorruptibility of the human soul, but he finds none of them persuasive.

Now if the will were merely intellectual appetite—that is, if it were aimed solely at happiness—we would not be able to choose in accordance with the moral law, since the moral law itself is not determined by any considerations about human happiness. Scotus’s great work is his commentary on the Sentences of Peter Lombardwhich contains ordinaito all the philosophical views and arguments for which he is well known, including the univocity ordinwtio beingthe formal distinctionless than numerical unity, individual nature or “thisness” haecceityhis critique of illuminationism and his renowned argument for the existence of Dunss.

It is possible that there is something different from God — it is not of itself because then it would not be the case that it were possiblenor from nothing.

For Scotus, the axiom stating that only the individual exists is a dominating lrdinatio of the understanding of reality.