Agranat Commission of Inquiry Interim Report (April ) il/news/politics/ Chapter 1: Preface. 1. Israel finally releases the late prime minister’s testimony before the Agranat in advance but did not properly pass information along, declassified report says. The Agranat Commission’s reports were ferociously debated on the front pages of newspapers, on radio and television, by every cab driver and shopkeeper.

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As Minister of Defense, Dayan had overall responsibility for the lack of readiness of IDF, and for IDF intelligence failures, as well as for not recommending an immediate call up of reserves either on Friday or Saturday morning before the attack. The findings of the Agranat Commission notwithstanding, Dayan panicked at a crucial moment and began repoort about “the fall of the Third Temple.

Further criticism responds to the Commission’s recommendations, stemming from the failure of military intelligence to assess the Arab states’ intent, that the IDF should not consider the intentions of hostile states, but rather their capacity for war. These failed in that they gave a completely inadequate warning to the IDF. Meir replied, “According to Aman reports, the Syrians thought Israel agtanat purposefully provoking them to drag them into a war.

Retrieved from ” https: Out of pages, divided into two volumes, the Commission approved the publication of no more than six introductory pages. I don’t have a reasonable response for this, I didn’t talk to the Aman chief, there are people who are bigger experts than me when it comes to Intel. What is Barlev Line?

Read the book here. Israel and the Arab World. However, he was certainly not more guilty than Moshe Dayan. As a response to the Commission’s criticism of using military intelligence as the aagranat route for analysis of information, the Foreign Ministry established a Research and Planning Department. Additional resignations of senior officers due to Agranat Commission recommendations included the head of the AMAN research departmentthe head of the Egyptian branch in the research department and others.

He took it in agranzt spirit, but I felt he wasn’t convinced. On July 10,the Commission issued a second interim report, which, unlike the first interim report, was almost completely censored. The final part of the report was published on 30 January What about the reality of the American airlift? After the warning was received, on the morning of Yom Kippur, the regular armored force did not deploy on the Suez canal front, and no clear order was re;ort to the head of the Southern Command General Gonenregarding how to deploy to meet the expected attack.


Despite the severe oversight, Meir supported Aman in her testimony. Committee member, former Chief of General Staff Yigael Yadinasked Meir invasive questions, compared to other members, who defended her.

We did not see it as deport of our job to express an rsport about what may be implied about their [ministerial] authority.

The Agranat Commission also determined that there was an inexcusable delay in calling up reserves, and that no defense plan for the case where the regular forces would need to hold back a general attack on the Syrian and Egyptian fronts simultaneously. The Agranat Commission determined that Shmuel Gonen Gorodish “Did not properly fulfill his agrnat and he is responsible in large part of the dangerous situation in reprot our forces were caught.

Likewise the Agranat Commission determined that “It is essential that the Prime Minister have access to policy, military and other evaluations that are collated and based on different points of view and do not come from a singe pipeline. In practice, the controversy about the report’s absence of criticism of Moshe Dayan led to a strengthening of the Chief of Staff’s position since he could argue that if the Agrnaat of Staff had sole responsibility, it must be the Chief of Staff’s decision.

The Commission issued the interim report. Zionism and Israel – Encyclopedic Dictionary.

The Agranat Commission

The “concept” was based on the assumption that Egypt would only attack if it had the air-power to take on the Israeli Air Force. Sufficient intelligence warnings from foreign and other sources had been received to indicate a high probability of war, certainly in the last few days prior to the war. A great deal of time was wasted because air command could not decide whether to attack air bases or SAM missile installations. In Hebrew, a chaf can never occur at the beginning of a word.

Judgment in Jerusalem

It just became insignificant. Tunnels bore, missiles mean war: This conception, which was based on some inflexible principles, prevented the evaluation and analysis of relevant intelligence information, that had arrived from various intelligence sources and warned explicitly of the dangers of war.


The mobile Sam 6 missiles in particular provided an anti-aircraft umbrella to the depth required for a 12 KM advance, and that was all the Egyptians intended to do. Among other things, this phase of the report focused on disciple in the units and in the emergency warehouse. Yadin continued, asking if it was okay that Zamir didn’t tell Meir before he left.

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Back to main page: Egypt before the war The War. After his dismissal, Elazar maintained ahranat had he been given more of the information, he would have mobilized the IDF sooner.

Its main clause stated:. The general killed slowly by the Yom Kippur War. A smattering of family members and fellow veterans gather at the Kiryat Shaul Military Cemetery in Tel Aviv to remember Shmuel Gonen — blamed by a generation for the losses on the southern front.

Agranat Commission

Many of the conclusions and hearings of the Agranat Commission were not fully declassified agganat many years, and perhaps some are still classified. This was a critical error that was responsible for the aggranat of many lives.

Golda Meir was directly responsible for failure to issue an order for general call up of reserves on the morning of Yom Kippur. When IDFA published a collection of Commission testimonies on its website in and —which included excerpts of the protocols of Prime Minister Golda Meir and tens of military officers—the minutes of these testimonies made headlines in several newspapers and television channels.

Meir said in her testimony that at the airport she received another report about the Syrian army bolstering forces and beginning of a military drill in Egypt.

Individual entries may be cited with credit to The Encyclopedia and Dictionary of Zionism and Israel. How did the war stop? Inthis special committee, spearheaded by Chairman Justice Yitzhak Engelhard, has gradually approved agranatt publication of about fifty testimonies, which have attracted substantial public interest.